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INTRODUCTION
As the focus of the United States military shifts from 
conventional warfare toward irregular warfare, interest has 
grown in the development of models that can simulate social 
behavior as it pertains to military operations. The 
contemporary operating environment, as reflected in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, shows the critical role the population 
portrays in modern combat.  Populations, whether broken 
into smaller social groups, granulated into individuals, or 
studied as an aggregate of social groups, are often the 
determinate of success in modern combat.  Therefore, the 
military’s interest in modeling social cognition has grown 
out of necessity.  The military uses models for  course of 
action analysis, training and rehearsal, and evaluation for 
acquisition.  If these models are not indicative of 
contemporary operations, they are not only lacking in utility, 
but are potentially harmful.
One new model which combines conventional warfare 
with the modern focus on the population is the Peace Support 
Operations Model (PSOM).  PSOM is a  simulation-based war 
game which portrays the populace and displays the effects 
military and political actions have on the populations.  During 
preliminary use, PSOM 
has shown potential as 
an analytic and 
training tool; however, 
to date the model has 
not been taken through 
any sort of VV&A 
process.  This can 
prove detrimental due 
to the tremendous risk 
inherited from using a 
model that has not 
been thoroughly 
e v a l u a t e d . O u r 
w o r k i n g g ro u p 
quantifiably analyzed 
PSOM using data 
farming to measure the 
limitations  and  constraints  of  the  model.
Methodology
• Our goal for IDFW 18 was to use quantitative analysis to 
explore the capabilities of PSOM.  Because the parameter 
space in a campaign level model such as PSOM is quite 
large,  the basis of our work was to leverage high 
performance computing and efficient design of 
experiments to run the model many times.  This process 
allows for the exploration of a very large parameter 
space in a limited amount of time.  Efficient design of 
experiments and statistical analysis permit us to 
determine which parameters and interactions are 
significant in PSOM.
 The scenario used to test the model is the ongoing war in 
Iraq as of 2004 (figure 3).  This scenario was developed by 
DSTL in 2008.  For the workshop we focused primarily on 
those regions of Iraq which are inhabited by the Sunni 
Population.  This limits the focus to about 30% of the 
population, 37 coalition combat maneuver battalions, and the 
faction of the Sunni Nationalists. The designs of experiments 
focus on the underlying assumptions about the Iraqi 
population, the capabilities and attributes of coalition and 
insurgent forces, the operational courses of action taken by 
coalition forces, and the systematic settings of PSOM.  The 
responses analyzed are primarily the changes in security in 
the nation and the population’s consent towards its own 
government and coalition forces (when needed, other outputs 
are taken into account).  The resulting statistical analysis is 
then used to gain insight into the vast space of possible 
PSOM inputs and their resulting outputs.
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Factor Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Description




CBT Units  Securing 
Sub Stance Patrol
CBT Units Providing 
Humanitarian Aid – 





maneuver BNʼs in 
Sunni inhabited 










Withdrawn 75 Sunni Nationalist 
Units (AQI and 
Militia) in Sunni 
inhabited regions 
take this stance.
IGO Stance Withdrawn Provide 
Humanitarian Aid
47 IGOʼs throughout 




Yes No Determines if the 
coalition and Sunni 
Nationalist share 
information
Table 1. Categorical Factors Explored
Factors explored
During the International Data Farming Workshop we chose 
a set of parameters from the scenario file of PSOM. These 
factors represent many of the assumptions specific to the 
scenario being simulated.  For this experiment these factors 
are applied to either the coalition forces, Sunni nationalists, 
or the Sunni population of Iraq.  Table 1 displays the 
categorical variables manipulated in the DOE.  Table 1. 
Categorical Factors Explored
Table 2 is an explanation of the continuous variables used 
in the experiment.
Factor Experimental Range Description  (Jon Parkman, 2008)
Coalition ROE 
Level 1-5
1 (Loose) and 5 (Tight) representing the 
degree to which the unit is willing to cause 






An integer between 1 (Low) and 5 (High) 
representing the degree to which the Unit is 
willing to suffer its own casualties in order to 
complete its tasks
Sunni ROE 







This is a value between 0 and 100, which 
give the Factionʼs Ideology based on its 
views on Personal freedom, through the 
Nolan chart system, as shown below
Sunni Marginal 
Gains 0-1
These values, one for each Good Type, 
control the level of importance that the Group 
places on the provision of that Good Type
Sunni Marginal 
Gains Security 0-1
This value controls the level of importance 





These values set the initial levels of Consent 
towards each Faction that are possessed by 









Casualty Tolerance value, which controls how 
many casualties the unit will bear each turn 








The level to which the Unit is trained and 




The degree to which the Population 
perceives that the Unit is unwilling to conduct 
offensive operations against them
Table 2. Continuous factors explored.
Description of Scenario
The scenario is Iraq 2004+ created by the developers of 
PSOM.  Figure 3 is a  general Description of the population 
and anti-Iraqi force lay-out used in the scenario.
Design of Experiment and Metrics
We used a  full  factorial design for the categorical variables 
crossed with an NOLH for the continuous variables resulting 
in a  DOE with 3120 design points covering a multitude of 
possible combinations of the factors.  We then ran each 
excursion 5 times in order to account for the very limited 
stochastic influence within PSOM.
The resulting design points were then analyzed using 
quadratic least squares regression models with two way 
interactions where the response variables are either the mean 
Sunni Population’s consent toward the coalition or the mean 
Security across Iraq.  
Figure 1. Iraq Scenario
Results and Analysis
Our resulting meta models proved accurate enough for 
further analysis. (Figure 2)
Figure 2. Consent toward coalition meta-model.
Looking at the scaled effects we found that the initial 
value for consent and the parameter Sunni Marginal gains for 
Security are the most significant factors examined in 
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determining consent.  The contour plot (Figure 3) shows the 
significance of these factors with respect to consent.
Figure 3. Contour plot of Sunni consent toward coalition with 
respect to Marginal Gain Security and Initial Consent.
We also found that coalition stance is a significant factor 
in respect to Sunni Consent for the coalition.
Looking at the response of security we had similar 
success with our meta model.  With an R squared of .76 we 
found the Rules of Engagement setting for factions to be 
particularly significant toward security.  We also found that 
the factions’  stances and the interactions of the stance of 
competing factions is particularly significant in the model as 
can be seen in figure 4.
Conclusions
The team’s main objective was to jointly agree on a set of 
parameters within PSOM which should be interesting and 
then use data farming to determine which of these factors 
truly are influential to both the consent metric and the 
security metric within PSOM.  Our hasty analyses conducted 
during the last day of the workshop proved positive toward 
PSOM potential uses.  Clearly the underlying assumptions 
about the population have tremendous implications on the 
model.  Also, we gained tremendous insight about the effects 
player decisions have toward both security and consent.  We 
clearly met our main objectives and in doing so have 
displayed the power of data farming in regards to the 
VV&A process for contemporary combat models.  
Stance
0 - Provide Humanitarina Aid
1 - Attack
2 - Provide Security
8 - Withdrawn
Figure 4. Line chart showing effects of stance 
with respect to security.
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